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Abstract Cultural trauma theory has emphasised the role of social groups in narrating, and
thereby attributing moral significance to, highly disruptive events. In contrast, this article
draws attention to professions such as the police and the media, which act as Bfact-finders^ to
establish the factual circumstances of events from which trauma narratives are created. The
article offers a case study of the June 1994 Matsumoto Sarin Incident in Japan, a terrorist
attack in which members of religious movement Aum Shinrikyō gassed residential streets
using sarin. Factual uncertainties surrounding the attack, in combination with institutional
failings by fact-finders that resulted in a false accusation, meant that carrier groups did not
identify the event as one that brought a collectivity’s underlying values into question; in other
words, cultural trauma as a discourse did not develop. It was only after Aum’s second sarin
attack on the Tokyo subway in March 1995, when the true perpetrators and motives were
finally uncovered, that Matsumoto belatedly became recognised as a traumatic assault on
Japan’s civic values. This article suggests that a collaborative approach combining science and
technology studies (STS) with collective memory studies could provide a fruitful avenue of
further research.
Keywords AumAffair . Aum Shinrikyo . Japan .Memory. Police . Journalism
The aim of this paper is to refine cultural trauma theory through a consideration of social
groups responsible for establishing the factual details of highly disruptive events. The theory of
cultural trauma states that certain events acquire a negative, indelible quality in a group’s
collective identity and memory when there is a sense of Bacute discomfort entering into the
core of the collectivity’s sense of its own identity^ (Alexander 2004b: 10). Cultural trauma
explicitly rejects Bnaturalistic^ theories of group trauma—which suggests that entire
Int J Polit Cult Soc
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10767-018-9282-1
Marcus Morgan (Bristol University) was Acting Editor for this article.
* Rin Ushiyama
ru210@cam.ac.uk
1 Department of Sociology, University of Cambridge, 16 Mill Lane, Cambridge CB2 1SB, UK
collectivities are automatically traumatised by devastating events—and advocates a systematic
study of the social conditions which make public articulations of group-level trauma possible.
By offering a constructionist approach to how some events become watershed moments in
collective memory but not others, cultural trauma theory has produced an array of historical
examples in which public expressions of trauma were delayed or repressed, due to the sheer
scale of the devastation (Alexander 2004a), political censorship and discrimination of victims
(Saito 2006), or dominant ideologies suppressing alternative interpretations of past violence
(Bartmanski and Eyerman 2011; Gao 2011). While sympathetic to these innovations, this
article offers a slightly different approach to explain the absence of cultural trauma discourse.
While existing studies have tended to explain the absence of trauma discourse to be the result
of material constraints (such as low economic capital or censorship), the aftermath of the
Matsumoto Sarin Incident provides an example in which trauma construction faltered due to
failures in forensics and related investigative procedures, leading to factual uncertainty. This
article presents a reconstruction of media coverage surrounding two terrorist attacks committed
by the millenarian new religious movement Aum Shinrikyō: the June 1994 Matsumoto Sarin
Incident and the March 1995 Tokyo Subway Sarin Incident, both of which attacked civilians
using deadly sarin gas. Following the Matsumoto attack on June 1994, missteps in police
investigation and news reporting meant that potential Bcarrier groups^ of trauma failed to
correctly identify perpetrators and their motives throughout 1994 and therefore struggled to
narrate the event as a cultural trauma. Aum’s attack on Tokyo in the following year enabled
investigators to discover the culprits and their motives, allowing stakeholders to put forward
trauma narratives about the Matsumoto attack, albeit with a significant period of latency and
also subsumed within a broader label of a greater national trauma known as the BAum Affair .^
Cultural Trauma and the BTrauma Process^
Cultural trauma’s most distinctive feature is its fundamental rejection of the idea that group-
level trauma is a natural consequence of devastating events. Whereas Kai Erikson’s (1976)
concept of Bcollective trauma^ refers to the breakdown of social solidarity and community
identity as a Bnatural^ and automatic consequence of communities devastated by disaster,
cultural trauma insists that events become recognised as traumatic in collective identity through
symbolic mediation, such as media reports, witness testimonies, artistic works, and films and
television. Cultural trauma describes not so much a collective state of being, but Bprocesses of
defining themeaning of events and attribution contests in which individuals and groups struggle
to define a situation and to manage and control it^ in response to a devastating phenomenon
(Eyerman 2015: 131). Jeffrey Alexander elaborates the four stages of this trauma process, in
which stakeholders rely on symbolic devices to articulate trauma narratives. First, the nature of
the pain and hurt must be identified; second, the victimsmust be named and identified; third, the
relationship of the victims to wider members of society must be established; and fourth,
responsibility and blame are attributed to perpetrators (Alexander 2004b: 12–15). Cultural
trauma theory thus stresses the presence of abstract and supra-individual and cultural schemata
that enable events to be Bcoded^, Bweighted^, and Bnarrated^ according to binary oppositions
such as victims and perpetrators, heroes and villains, good and evil, purity and impurity, and
sacred and profane (Alexander 2004a: 200–204). These symbolic representations enable wider
audiences to recognise events that they have not experienced first-hand as being fundamental
and indelible to their collective identity and collective memory.
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Various carrier groups are important for presenting competing interpretations of events to
the public; this includes individuals and groups such as public intellectuals, victims, and civil
advocacy groups, as well as institutions such as the state and media outlets. These struggles
over meaning occur in multiple arenas and industries, ranging from news media, politics, law,
academia, art, and entertainment. Nor are these struggles are not purely Bsymbolic^, or
concerned only with Binterpretations^: they encompass issues of responsibility (moral or
legal), criminal justice, diplomacy, financial redress, and commercial interests. Once certain
representations of trauma are routinized through repeated and regular commemorative pro-
cesses—including commemorative ceremonies, monuments, museums, legislation, and edu-
cation—cultural trauma develops into a structural force, even shaping the memories of
geographically distant collectivities and future generations.
The cultural trauma approach overcomes a major shortcoming within existing literature on
commemoration and collective memory, which has produced many instances of Bsuccessful^
commemoration, but fewer instances of collective forgetting, repression, and amnesia (Conway
2010: 448). Crucially, cultural trauma theorists have sought to explain the absence of group-level
traumabyaskingwhetherornotcarriergroupsareable toBcarry^ the trauma tobroaderaudiences.
For instance, Rui Gao (2011), in a study of 20th Century China, attributes the scarcity of trauma
discourse on Japanese atrocities in wartime China to political conditions under Mao: Rui
demonstrates that theBtraumadrama^ofclass struggleagainst theKuomintangwasaBubiquitous
and compelling force^ which took priority over representations of the war against Japan (Gao
2011: 72). Bartmanski and Eyerman (2011) also reconstruct a case of trauma suppression
surrounding theKatynMassacre, as theydemonstrate that theSoviets’slaughterofPolishsoldiers
andciviliansbecameadistinctlyPolish traumaonlyafter thecollapseofSoviet socialism,atwhich
pointcarriergroupswereable tonarrate their traumaticexperiencespubliclyandfreely.Thesecase
studies demonstrate trauma construction is contingent on a number of material and symbolic
constraints, including political censorship, economic capital, access tomedia outlets and cultural
industries (including newspapers, book and magazine publishers, theatres, and film studios, to
namea few), andwider socio-political contexts that facilitate orhinder the symbolic identification
of victims and perpetrators with audiences.
If cultural trauma theorists agree on the role of narrative as the foundation of cultural
trauma, there appears to be less consensus on whether or not Bfictional^ or Bimagined^
traumas have the potential to become cultural traumas. Whereas Alexander holds that Bevents
that are deeply traumatizing may not actually have occurred at all^ (Alexander 2004b: 8), Piotr
Sztompka diverges from this view, suggesting that cultural traumas are located in real,
Btraumatogenic^ events, which are instances of sudden, disruptive social change that affects
large proportions of a population. These include violent events such as wars, foreign conquest
as well as stock market crashes, and revolutions (Sztompka 2004: 158–160). It would be
beyond the modest scope of this article to settle these seemingly contradictory positions on
such a general point. Nonetheless, this case study shows a historic example in which the event
was undoubtedly real and traumatogenic, yet trauma discourse did not arise: not due to active
attempts by stakeholders to prevent the articulation of trauma narratives, but due to the scarcity
of known Bfacts^. This suggests that a minimal level of established facts is necessary to claim
events to be traumatic: consequently, examples of purely fictitious or imagined cultural
traumas are the exception than the norm. This study of the Matsumoto attack—which itself
has rarely been the object of scholarly research in the English-speaking world—shows how
social norms and conventions governing the discovery of facts can fail, and such a failure can
thwart attempts to narrate trauma in terms of their moral impact on collective identity. The lack
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of reliable facts surrounding an event, such as the identity of the perpetrators, their modus
operandi, and their motives, makes it difficult for actors to create convincing trauma narratives
and make moral judgments about them (admitting, of course, that the immoral nature of events
may be self-explanatory, such as in some terrorist attacks). Hence, this article calls attention to
different social processes that discover and establish facts relating to an event, which then
contribute to the subsequent attempts to attach moral meanings to them.
To do this, this article proposes a conceptual distinction between two sets of carrier groups
of trauma, with reference to the division of labour involved in Btrauma work^ after a
devastating event. First, Bfact-finders^ primarily aim to clarify and establish the factual
circumstances of traumatic events. Second, Bnarrators^ aim to communicate the moral signif-
icance of those events to broad audiences based on the known facts. Whereas previous
literature on cultural trauma has tended to emphasise the role of narrators—public intellectuals
in particular—as the primary carrier groups (Alexander 2004b; Baert 2015; Eyerman 2001;
Eyerman 2011), this typology draws attention to a more diverse range of occupations and
professions tasked with ascertaining the factual details of shocking, disruptive phenomena.
This distinction is partly indebted to the strong programme in cultural sociology (Alexander
and Smith 2003), and its argument that facts are distinguishable from their Bmeanings^: facts
do not speak for themselves but need to be symbolically organised and narrated to have
Bmeaning^ with reference to Bvalues^ (Alexander 2003: 156). However, it is worth adding to
this view that facts are not always self-evident and are frequently the outcome of socially
mediated processes which Bdiscover^ them, especially in events of historical significance. As
scholars of collective memory will likely agree, establishing what happened in the past
(immediate or distant) is a deeply contentious and resource-intensive task, not only subject
to professional disagreements among experts but also vulnerable to manipulation and revision
by dominant groups. Collecting evidence to establish what happened in the aftermath of
violence and destruction is therefore especially time-consuming, expensive, physically de-
manding, and emotionally draining. Following devastating events, it could take days and
weeks, if not months, to approximate and calculate the loss and damage, even before narrators
can take up the role of assigning the moral significance to them.
A number of professions are responsible for establishing the facts of a devastating event,
even if they do not themselves directly or publicly communicate the meanings of those events.
In the aftermath of wars and genocides, UN fact-finding missions, the military, peacekeeping
forces, aid workers, and foreign correspondents help to estimate the damage and loss to local
populations. In the aftermath of crimes and terrorist attacks, the police, intelligence services,
coroners, and forensic scientists will likely play a leading role in clarifying the details of the
case, to be put forward and contested in court at a later point. In other instances such as natural
disasters, emergency services, the medical profession, and local volunteer groups (to name but
a few) may help to establish the extent of destruction. For events that have happened in the
past, the role of historians and archivists may become more important. Other professions may
also help to quantify the losses financially: in many of these disruptive instances, insurance
loss adjustors quantify the impact as economic loss, which can then form the legal basis for
financial restitution. Put simply, these fact-finders provide a wealth of Bdata^—death and
casualty tolls, official records, survivor and witness testimonies, audio-visual evidence, and
forensic evidence—which narrators such as journalists, artists, and public intellectuals can then
use to make claims about the moral significance of destructive and distressing events. The
relationship between fact-finders and narrators is often mutually beneficial. Narrators such as
news outlets rely on fact-finding professionals to provide clarity and lend authority to
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otherwise uncertain or chaotic situations, for example, to demonstrate that Hurricane Katrina
was much more than an ordinary Bstorm^ (Eyerman 2015: 41). In turn, experts benefit from
greater media exposure and public authority by contributing to public debates.
A useful way to distinguish the two carrier groups is to understand their different relation-
ships to the public. Fact-finders do not necessarily speak directly to the public: for aid workers
in disaster zones, narrating trauma to the public is a secondary concern; for the police
pursuing suspects, sharing sensitive information with the public may even be undesirable.
By contrast, narrators fulfil their role as public communicators first, and investigators second.
Of course, any ideal-typical distinction comes with exceptions, and there are instances when
fact-finders can double as narrators, and vice versa. For example, police forces often publicly
condemn terrorist attacks as heinous assaults on civic values. NGOs such as Human Rights
Watch and Amnesty International can combine fact-finding and expertise with political
advocacy in the hope of communicating the trauma of victimised groups to broader audiences.
Journalists and documentary film makers can also be considered as carrier groups that move
relatively fluidly between fact-finding and narrating. John Hersey’s (1946) reportage of
Hiroshima and Claude Lanzmann’s (2007[1985]) epic documentary Shoah are primary exam-
ples in which discovering facts through witness testimony is inseparable from the act of
communicating those testimonies to the public through artistic narration. Nonetheless, there
are limits to the extent to which narrators can establish facts: journalists nor film makers have
the occupational capacity to declare official death tolls, formally identify suspects, or quantify
economic loss.
In cases when the facts of a disruptive event cannot be established, narrators struggle to
attach moral meanings to them; consequently, even devastating events can fail to become
traumas if known facts are in short supply. How could narrators convince audiences that
fundamental moral values had been breached, if they cannot persuasively describe and explain
what happened? Beyond the example discussed in this article, the disappearance of the
Malaysian Airlines flight MH370 in March 2014 is another case in point. The sudden
disappearance of a passenger aircraft carrying 227 passengers was itself a shocking event that
reverberated across multiple countries, including Malaysia, China, and Australia. However, the
ensuing—and still ongoing—difficulty in locating the aircraft’s precise location and the lack of
convincing explanations for its disappearance have meant that trauma narratives have been
underdeveloped, leaving discursive space open for tenuous conspiracy theories (Lusher 2017).
To date, narrators have struggled to convincingly demonstrate the nature of the plane’s
disappearance, extend symbolic identification with victims, or allocate responsibility. Thus,
despite the presumed deaths of over 200 passengers and staff, and the anguish of families who
have lost their loved ones, the event has yet emerged as a cultural trauma in any of the affected
countries. When there are few known facts to back up their narratives, narrators cannot carry
the trauma to more general audiences.
It should be clarified here that fact-finding is itself shaped through cultural factors. Fact-
finding is subject to Bcultural constraints^ in two senses of the term: first, socio-cultural norms
and value systems that affect the whole of society, and second, professional norms and values
that govern fact-finding activities within specific institutional settings. At the level of national
or regional culture, norms constrain the reliability of data. Yang Jisheng’s (2012) historiogra-
phy of China’s famine during the Great Leap Forward illustrates the difficulties of gathering
reliable statistics for a period when rural starvation was a taboo topic for discussion and
mortality rates were systematically distorted to downplay the extent of the famine. If political
norms hampered Yang’s attempts to gather accurate statistics, religious norms likely influenced
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Durkheim’s (2002) statistics on suicide, as Jack Douglas (1967) argued. The moral bias against
suicide in predominantly Catholic countries could have resulted in lower reported rates of
suicide, either because victims’ relatives sought to persuade coroners for the death to be
classed as Baccidents^ (Douglas 1967: 205–207) or because the victim may have disguised the
death as an accident (Ibid.: 208–209). This calls into question Durkheim’s claim that Catholic
countries enjoy lower suicide rates because of greater social solidarity.
At lower levels of generality, the production of facts as a form of knowledge is dependent
on cultural norms governing professional institutions. As scholars of science and technology
studies (STS) have argued, Bnormal science^ is governed by norms and conventions which
regulate what constitutes valid Bscientific^ Bknowledge^ and Bdiscovery^ (Bloor 1991[1976];
Latour and Woolgar 1986). In the laboratory, Latour and Woolgar argued, the production of
facts depends on Ba complex mixture of beliefs, habits, systematised knowledge, exemplary
achievements, experimental practices, oral traditions, and craft skills^ shared within profes-
sional fields (Latour and Woolgar 1986: 54). A scientific finding gradually becomes fact
through a series of social processes within this professional culture—first outlined through
repeated experiments, then elaborated and defended through working papers, conference
presentations, and finally published as journal articles—until it eventually takes on a Bquality
which appears to place it beyond the scope of some kinds of sociological and historical
explanation^ (Ibid.: 107). These scientific standards contrast with other occupational cultures
in the police, forensic science, and the judiciary, in which a combination of Bdirect evidence^,
such as fingerprints and DNA samples, and Bwitness statements^ helps to ascertain the facts
relating to a criminal case (Kruse 2016). In establishing identities of potential suspects,
technologies such as CCTV (Douillet and Dumoulin 2015), fingerprint matching (Cole
2001), and DNA identification (Renard 2015, Robert and Dufresne 2015) rely on networks
of specialist institutions such as analysis laboratories, investigative agencies, and databases,
enabling specialists to identify matches with samples. Fact-finding is therefore a practice
firmly grounded in social, cultural, political, technological, and historical contexts.
In incorporating some aspects of STS, especially theActor-NetworkTheory (ANT), there is a
potential tension between the separation of the Bmaterial^ and symbolic worlds as advocated in
cultural sociologyandANT’scritiqueof suchadivisionasbeinghistoricallyspecific toBmodern^
Enlightenment thought, and therefore problematic (Latour 1993). ANT’s conscious valuation of
human and nonhuman agents as analytically equal units also raises questions about the potential
agency of nonhuman Bactants^ (Latour 2005)—such asweapons used inwar terrorismor natural
phenomena such as hurricanes and earthquakes—in the creation of traumanarratives. A compre-
hensive application ofANTin the analysis of cultural traumamay indeed be possible, but it is not
the aimof this article. SomeofANT’smore radical proposals, such as the rejectionof the division
between nature and culture, scientific and political, or nonhuman and human, are of questionable
utility in studying cultural trauma, for the obvious reason that cultural trauma is concerned with
meanings human agents create about themselves and theworld. Instead, I suggest amoremodest
fusionofSTSwithcollectivememorystudiesbyopeningup theblackboxof fact creation through
a study of professional institutions, and how human uses and interactionswith technologies may
influence the social construction of collective trauma.
In what follows, this article reconstructs the aftermath of the Matsumoto Sarin Incident, in
which fact-finders—including the police, forensic scientists, and journalists—failed to correctly
identify the culprits andmotives, because existing professional norms of police investigation and
media reporting were ill-suited to deal with an unprecedented case of indiscriminate terrorism
using sarin. The police’s insistence on extracting a confession from an innocent survivor whom
Ushiyama
they suspected and newsmedia’s over-reliance on the police for information doubly hindered the
identification of the attack’s true culprits and an exploration of alternative scenarios. As new
evidencewas slow toemerge, this line of investigation stalled and the event riskedbecoming, like
the MH370 disappearance, a Bmystery .^ Consequently, until the 1995 Tokyo subway attack,
stakeholders struggled to comprehend the event as an assault on fundamental cultural values
despite the trauma and devastation experienced by an entire neighbourhood.
The Context Leading Up to the Matsumoto Sarin Incident
Aum Shinrikyō (commonly referred to simply as Aum) was a millenarian new religious
movement founded by self-proclaimed guru Asahara Shōkō, which began in 1984 as a small
yoga class called Aum Society (Oumu no Kai).1 Aum’s belief system consisted of a syncretic,
eclectic mixture of various religious traditions such as Hinduism, Tibetan Buddhism, New Age
spiritualism, and later, Christianity. Urging his followers to renounce their worldly possessions
(in essence, donating one’s assets to the movement), Asahara poured scorn on consumer
capitalism and promised spiritual enlightenment through a combination of ascetic practice and
mystical experiences. Aum grew quickly in size, with younger generations comprising the vast
majority of the membership in the context of a national boom in new religious movements,
occultism, and spiritualism; in 1995, when the full membership was revealed, 75% of its
members were in their twenties and thirties (Shimazono 1995: 384). In 1987, Asahara changed
the name of the group to Aum Shinrikyō to better reflect his wish to turn the yoga class into a
religion (Shinrikyō translates to BReligion of Truth^). With Asahara placing himself as the
omniscient guru and prophet, Aum operated on a strict hierarchy based on the level of the
individual’s spiritual attainment: a system which, in reality, favoured those with academic and
professional qualifications.
Although Aum started as a peaceful movement, Asahara’s paranoid delusions, predilections
for violence, and apocalyptic predictions soon came to define Aum’s character. The 1990
general election, in which Asahara and twenty-four other candidates stood and suffered a
humiliating defeat, was a turning point in the group’s career. Disappointed by the public’s lack
of interest, Asahara changed the group’s direction from salvation of the masses through
conversion to takeover of the Japanese state by force (Tsukada 2011).2 Predicting that World
War Three and a thermo-nuclear war were imminent and inevitable, Asahara claimed that Aum
would become the new rulers of a post-apocalyptic world; to survive, however, they needed to
militarize and defend themselves (Reader 2000). Asahara organised and ordered a small team
of scientists to develop biological and chemical weapons to fight against Aum’s imaginary
enemy (the Judeo-Masonic conspiracy which controlled the Japanese government) and to
prepare for impending doom (Tsuji 2011; Hirano 2011).
1 In the English language, Reader (2000) and Shimazono (1995) provide arguably the most comprehensive
histories of Aum Shinrikyō in the years leading up to the Tokyo sarin attack.
All Japanese names appear in Japanese style, with the surname first, unless otherwise stated.
2 It is important to not exaggerate this turn as a sudden change from peaceful methods to relying on violence, not
least because Asahara and his aides had already committed multiple murders before this election. In early 1989,
Asahara ordered the murder of Taguchi Shūji, a dissident member, and in late 1989, he ordered the murders of
anti-Aum lawyer Sakamoto Tsutsumi, his wife, and their one-year-old baby. Nonetheless, Asahara’s former aides
have stated that the election loss led to his distrust of the Japanese public, which may have subsequently
contributed to Aum’s turn to terrorism (Jōyū 2012; Noda 2009).
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Two concepts in Aum’s belief system were particularly important in justifying its turn to
militarism and violence: Vajrayāna and poa. In Aum’s interpretation, Vajrayāna (Bdiamond
vehicle^) designated a mode of salvation which justified the enlightened guru to do whatever
is necessary for the greatest good. This stood in contrast to lower Bvehicles^ to enlightenment,
Hinayāna (Bsmall vehicle^) and Mahayāna (Blarge vehicle^) which stressed individual en-
lightenment and conversion of the masses respectively. The Vajrayāna principle that the guru’s
orders were sacred and inviolable justified violence against members and outsiders through
poa, a ritual of Btransference of souls^ (Shimada 2012 vol.1: 164–171). According to the
principle of poa, Asahara, as an omniscient guru, could kill individuals whom he knew to
commit evil deeds before they actually committed those acts: this prevented the victim from
accruing negative karma and promised them a better rebirth. As an enlightened figure, the guru
(and by extension his followers who carried out the orders) would not accrue negative karma
from killing either (Reader 2000; Shimazono 1995: 406). Following the election defeat,
Asahara signalled that the Japanese population was no longer able to be saved by conversion,
and that they had to be Bsaved^ in death through poa (Tsukada 2011: 324–325; Noda 2010:
31; Hayakawa and Kawamura 2005: 166).
Known as Bsecret work^, militarizationwas carried out byAsahara’s closest aides, hidden from
rank-and-file believers. Aum’s scientists—many of whom had advanced degrees in the natural
sciences but were by no means experts—struggled to produce any biological weapons. However,
they eventually foundmore success in chemical weapons,managing to produce lethal quantities of
phosgene, sarin, and VX. Following failed assassination attempts on Aum’s perceived enemies
using sarin (including Ikeda Daisaku, the leader of the new religious movement Sōka Gakkai
International, andTakimotoTarō, avocal criticofAum),AsaharaorderedaBfield test^on thecityof
Matsumotoincentral Japan.Thehumanexperimenthadapracticalaimofsabotagingatrial inwhich
Aum was a defendant. Aum had purchased land with the intention of building a commune, but
without telling the previous landowner of this fact.Amidst local protests, the former landowner had
suedAum tonullify the transaction on the basis thatAumprovidedmisinformation; the verdictwas
expected to be in the landowner’s favour (Reader 2000: 209; Shimada 2012 vol.1: 26). With the
verdict to be delivered on 28th June,Asahara orderedMuraiHideo, the head scientist at the helmof
themilitarization programme, to attack a residential complex formembers of the judiciary to kill or
maim them.3On the night of 27th June at around 10.30 pm,Aum’s customised truck drove through
Matsumoto as it sprayed sarin. A gentle breeze carried the vapours throughout the neighbourhood,
entering homes within minutes. Seven were killed in the attack, and an eighth victim died in 2008
fromphysicalaftereffectsof sarinpoisoning.Scoreswerehospitalisedovernightandhundredsmore
injured,as localauthoritiesstruggledtocomprehendwhathadhappenedinthequietneighbourhood.
Aum accomplished the two goals of testing a chemical weapon on a large population and delaying
the outcome of the trial.
The Fact-Finders Fail: the Immediate Aftermath
The nation woke up to the news of the incident with shock and confusion. Matsumoto, a small
regional city in the centre of Honshū Island with a population of around 200,000, was hardly an
obvious target for terrorism.Historically, a number ofdomestic terrorists—manyof themmilitant
3 Yomiuri Shimbun (1995) BMatsumoto sarin jiken saisho no hyōteki wa Nagano chisai shibu^, 13th July
(Evening Edition—henceforth Eve. Ed.), p.19.
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Marxist guerrillas—had targeted public institutions such as banks and police stations using
firearms and explosives. The details of what happened at Matsumoto therefore did not fit with
known modus operandi of existing right-wing or left-wing armed groups. Moreover, by the
1990s, a bloodyhistory of sectarian violence amongmilitant leftist groupshad led to their decline
(Igarashi 2007). For security authorities, the attack was wholly unexpected and unprecedented.
The primary fact-finders in the immediate aftermath of the attack were emergency service
responders, the medical profession in Nagano Prefecture, and investigators from the Nagano
Prefectural Police. As initial news reports show, evidence was sparse. On the day after the
attack, reporters only knew that many had died suddenly and that scores of people had been
hospitalised due to a nauseous gas. The Bcrime scenes^ were multiple and dispersed over a
large area; Aum had sprayed sarin from a moving vehicle, leaving very few pieces of physical
evidence in their path. The emergency services did not even know what the gas was, let alone
how it had been spread.4 This uncertainty, however, did not stop the police or the media from
making accusations based on flimsy circumstantial evidence. The police’s most urgent line of
enquiry was to investigate Kōno Yoshiyuki, an office worker and father who was the first to
contact emergency services; his house was next to the car park where Aum had begun to spray
sarin. On the night of the attack, he noticed a strange sound outside and found his dogs
convulsing on the ground. As he came back into the house to alert his wife, he found her
collapsed on the floor; as he called for an ambulance, he himself was also poisoned by the gas
(Kōno 2001). His wife fell into a coma from which she never awoke until her eventual death in
2008, while Kōno and his eldest daughter were also hospitalised.
Both the police and the national press—the former as fact-finders and the latter as a combina-
tion of fact-finders and narrators—were misled by their professional norms and expectations. In
the initial days after the attack, it did not occur to anyone in the immediate aftermath that the
incident could be a malicious, indiscriminate attack on civilians. Instead, the police and media
inferred the eventwas a chemical experiment gonewrong. In this improvised scenario,Kōnowas
trying tomake apotent pesticidebymixingchemicals andcalled for helpwhen it produceda toxic
gas. On 30th June, national newspaper Asahi Shimbun reported the Prefectural Police had
concluded that Ban unspecified mistake while combining chemicals produced a toxic gas^.5
Following this line of investigation, the media collated circumstantial evidence and eye-witness
accounts that supported this hypothesis. Unsubstantiated reports claimed Kōno had admitted
responsibility to his son and warned him to prepare for police investigation (Kōno 2001: 88).
These implicit admissions of guilt were entirely fictional; it is possible that the police had
informally fed the information to themedia, so thatpublic reportsofhisculpabilitywouldpressure
Kōno to confess (Ibid.: 242). Circumstantial evidence seemed to point towards his involvement:
thereweresightingsofamist aroundKōno’s house, fourhoursbefore the initial emergencycalls6;
animals inhisgarden, includinghisdogsandfish in thepond,haddied; theplants inhisgardenhad
withered. One early report concluded that it was Ba situation in which it was impossible not to
suppose that some kind of chemical had been spilled^.7 Police located buckets and dishes in the
4 Asahi Shimbun (1994) BNazo no yūdoku gasu de 7 nin shibō^, 28th June (Eve. Ed.), p.1; BGen’in wa? Naze
Jūtakuchi?^, 28th June (Eve. Ed.), p.14; BNemuri no machi o doku ga osotta^, 28th June (Eve. Ed.), p.15;
Yomiuri Shimbun (1994) BNagano Matsumoto no chūshinbu jūtakugai de yūdoku gasu, 7 nin shinu^, 28th June
(Eve. Ed.), p.1.
5 Asahi Shimbun (1994) BMatsumoto yūdoku gasu, chōgō misu de hassei^, 30th June (Eve. Ed.), p.19.
6 Yomiuri Shimbun (1994) BMatsumoto no yūdoku jiken shiroi kiri, 4 jikan mae kara^, 1st July, p.35.
7 Yomiuri Shimbun (1994) BMatsumoto gasu jikojūtakugai no niwa de yakubutsu jikken!?^, 29th June, p.31.
Translations by the author.
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garden, supposedly used for mixing chemicals. Initial forensic analysis indicated the presence of
phosphates, a compound commonly found in pesticides. Meanwhile, Kōno strongly denied any
involvementwhen the police interviewed him in hospital.Hewas effectively placed under police
supervision as he recuperated.8
In the first few days after the attack, the BMatsumoto Toxic Gas Incident^, as it was
reported in the media, did not develop into national trauma discourse. Despite the tragedy of an
entire community torn apart by the attack, there was no sense that fundamental moral values
had been breached, or that Japan’s civil values had been threatened. Matsumoto’s relative
marginality as a small regional city also arguably added to public perceptions of the event as a
relatively distant phenomenon. Furthermore, although the attack caused panic overnight, there
was no breakdown of social order. In all other parts of the country, life went on as normal, and
there was little sense of systemic breakdown or crisis, as was the case in the Tokyo sarin attack
nine months later.
The initial lessons the media drew from the incident demonstrate how widely off the mark fact-
finderswere.9 TheAsahiwrote in the editorial on 29th June, B[w]hy did he try tomake a pesticide by
himself, what kind of pesticide did he try to make, why did it result in so many casualties; there are
manyunclearpoints,but it isahorrificeventthatshouldnothavehappened^.Theeditorialpontificated
that Bthis incident reiterates the fact that our lives are side-by-side with harmful chemicals^; it
concluded, B[t]here are, in fact, many dangerous substances around us that, oncewemake amistake
of mishandling, could lead to irredeemable outcomes. This incident teaches us the eeriness of this
fact^.10 Although some scientists cast doubt on this Baccidental narrative^ given the scientific
impossibility of creating so potent a gas frompesticides and other chemicals found inKōno’s shed,11
both the police andmedia set up this narrative based on heavy speculation and scant evidence.
This accidental narrative suddenly collapsed on 4th July, a week after the attack, when
forensic scientists formally identified the toxic gas as sarin.12 The history of sarin as a chemical
weapon developed by the Nazis, which Beven Hitler hesitated to use^ due to its high toxicity,
introduced a new, sinister dimension to the incident.13 The discovery should have exonerated
Kōno at this point. After all, he lacked the required expertise, ingredients, or apparatus to
produce the deadly nerve agent (Aum, by contrast, had custom-built a laboratory for this
purpose). Moreover, he had no motive nor the resources to be able to commit the attack by
himself single-handedly. Instead of abandoning this line of enquiry, however, the police and
media together modified the accidental narrative to imply Kōno had produced the gas
deliberately. This was partially due to the police’s ignorance of sarin production methods
(NHK Supesharu Shuzai Han 2013: 122): in the media, some self-styled Bexperts^ suggested
sarin could be made by mixing chemicals in a bucket (Kōno 2001: 138). It is apparent that the
idea that Kōno could be innocent never crossed the minds of investigators or reporters at this
point.14
8 Asahi Shimbun (1994) BMatsumoto yūdoku gasu, chōgō misu de hassei^, 30th June (Eve. Ed.), p.19.
9 Asahi Shimbun (1994) BShirōto no chōgō ni ayausa san konnyū de gasu^, 29th June (Eve. Ed.), p.19; Yomiuri
Shimbun 1st July 1994, p.3.
10 Asahi Shimbun (1994) BYakubutsu to tonariau kurashi no kowasa^, 29th June, p.5. All translations of Japanese
texts by the author.
11 Asahi Shimbun (1994) BShinkei gasu ni ruiji ka^, 1st July (Osaka Edition), p.31.
12 Asahi Shimbun (1994) BShinkei gasu ‘sarin’ kenshutsu^, 4th July, p.1; Yomiuri Shimbun (1994), BMatsumoto
no shūdan higai Nachi kaihatsu no dokugasu ‘sarin’^, 4th July, p.31.
13 Yomiuri Shimbun (1994) BSarin kakuheiki nami sasshōryoku^, 8th July, p.15.
14 Asahi Shimbun (1994) BShinkei gasu ‘sarin’ kenshutsu^, 4th July, p.1; BSarin seisei no kanōsei bunseki^, 4th
July, p.15; Yomiuri Shimbun (1994) BMatsumoto no chūdoku jiken shinkei gasu ‘sarin’ kenshutsu^, 4th July, p.1.
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The emergent frame of the attack as a deliberate act of mass murder created a sense of
collective unease, raising the possibility of narrators situating the attack as a heinous attack on
innocent civilians. However, the trajectory of discourse surrounding the Matsumoto attack did
not develop in this direction, for multiple reasons. Firstly, the misidentification of the culprit as
a lone killer meant that the attack was construed as the result of a local dispute, not as a
politically motivated attack. To this effect, the media defamed Kōno to situate him as the
culprit; this included an unsubstantiated rumour that a man (hinted to be Kōno) had boasted
about a weapon that could kill dozens (Ibid.: 139; 171–174).15
Secondly, the attack diverged from patterns of domestic organised violence, in which
Marxist guerrillas often used firearms and explosives. They tended to target public institutions,
such as government buildings, public transport, and banks, not residential streets of a regional
city. When terrorist groups attacked civilians in hostage situations (such as when leftist
guerrillas hijacked an airplane and flew to North Korea in 1970), the culprits had claimed
responsibility and made their political demands clear. When the Busual suspects^ failed to
claim responsibility for the attack, there were no clear suspects besides Kōno. This likely
motivated the police to continue to treat Kōno as the prime suspect. Thirdly, few other pieces
of evidence emerged, prompting the police to obstinately rely on the tried and tested method of
extracting a confession from the suspect.
Despite an expert analysis that Kōno could not have produced sarin with the ingredients and
apparatus at his house,16 the police continued to press Kōno for information as a key person of
interest. When Kōno was discharged from hospital on 30th July, he held a press conference to
protest the vilification of his character and agreed to police interviews.17 Kōno sat two days of
intensive questioning, at which point his health deteriorated again. He also refused further
interviews as he took offence at the police’s attempt to coerce him to confess (Ibid.). Gradually,
Kōnoalsobegan toactivelychallengepredominant representationsofhimasasuspectbymeeting
with reporters and experts: experts concluded that it was impossible for Kōno to havemade sarin
(Ibid.:117–122).This led toagradual shift in symbolic representationsofKōnofromamysterious
misanthropic figure to a devoted husband and fatherwho suffered a tragedy.Althoughhewas not
fully exonerated, the plurality of media representation of Kōno, together with the absence of
evidence,meant that the narrative ofKōno as the culprit gradually lost persuasiveness. It is worth
noting that media outlets do not appear to have seriously explored alternative scenarios that
exoneratedKōno.UntilKōnopersonally intervened throughmedia appearances, news gathering
seems tohave been almost solelydependent on the police for any information—another failureof
professional norms.
Fact-finders struggled to make progress. The Nagano Prefectural Police had gained evidence
thatAum’s proxieshadpurchasedmassivequantitiesof sarin ingredients.Therewerealso reports
ofstrangesmellsnearAum’sheadquarters inJuly1994. InSeptember, thepolice secretlyobtained
soil samples containing sarin residue near Aum’s facilities (NHK Supesharu Shuzaihan 2013:
128–129). However, these findings were kept secret and did not lead to overt police operations
against Aum; there was still insufficient evidence to investigate Aum forMatsumoto, and a legal
15 Asahi Shimbun (1994) BSarin izen nazo, nazo^, 19th August, p.3.
16 Asahi Shimbun (1994) BŌshū shita yakuhin 24 shurui de sarin no gōsei fukanō^, 11th July, p.19; Yomiuri
Shimbun (1994) BShūdan gasu chūdoku jiken fusso kagōbutsu, hakken sarezu^, 6th July, p.14.
17 Asahi Shimbun (1994) B‘Sarin no namae, hajimete shitta’Matsumoto gasu chūdoku daiippō tsūhōsha kaiken^,
30th July (Eve. Ed.), p.21; BAratamete kanyo o hitei Tsuhō shita kaishain ga taiinshi kaiken^, 30th July (Eve.
Ed), p.21; Yomiuri Shimbun (1994) BMatsumoto no dokugasu yūdoku jiken kaishain taiin^, 30th July (Eve. Ed.),
p.11.4.
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loopholemeant sarin productionwas not itself a criminal offence. TheNagano Prefectural Police
therefore remained on standby, unable to launch a large-scale operation. As new information
failed topublicly emerge,narrators struggled toproduceanyconvincing traumanarratives;media
outlets slowly fell silent and eventually stopped reporting on Matsumoto but stopped short of
vindicatingKōnoorofferingapologies.Victimsandbereaved families also expressed sorrowand
suffering on individual terms, but not in relation to cultural identity and values.18
For the rest of 1994, then, theMatsumoto Sarin Incident became amystery, and an Benigma^,
but certainly not a trauma pertained to collective identity or memory.19 Though an Beerie^
(Bbukimi^) and Bfrustrating^ (Bmodokashii^) case, the incident did not shake the foundations of
collective identityas theTokyoattackwould thenextyear.20 In1994,notoncewas theMatsumoto
sarin attack identified as a Bterrorist attack^ by national newspapers Asahi Shimbun or Yomiuri
Shimbun. One example demonstrates the relatively small impact that theMatsumoto attackmade
on the public consciousness. In the 1994 end of the year readers’ poll in theYomiuri (see Table 1),
theMatsumoto Sarin Incident was voted to be the tenthmost important event in 1994, behind the
summer heatwave anddrought (no.1), a popular baseball teamwinning the championship (no. 4),
and thepricehikeof ricecausedbyahistoricdrought (no.8).21This stands incontrast to theTokyo
Subway Sarin Incident and the AumAffair, which, in the same poll a year later, was voted as the
secondmost importantnewseventafter theGreatHanshin(Kōbe)Earthquake.22 Inshort, in1994,
the Matsumoto sarin attack was hardly recognised as a national trauma, and risked falling into
obscurity as an unsolved mystery. Meanwhile, Aum continued to attempt Bpoa^ of various
enemies using chemical weapons throughout 1994.
1995 and the Tokyo Sarin Incident as a Turning Point
The transformativemoment cameonNewYear’sDay1995, asYomiuri Shimbun’s exclusive report
relayed earlier police discoveries that traces of sarin residue had been detected in Kamikuishiki
village, Yamanashi Prefecture. Although the article itself did not mention Aum by name,
Kamikuishiki was known as Aum’s headquarters.23 Other news outlets followed suit, sometimes
mentioningAumbyname, towhichAumrespondedbyvehementlydenyinginvolvementandsuing
media outlets for defamation.24AsAumcameunder greater public scrutiny, journalists unearthed a
litany of past troubles and conflicts, contributing to their notoriety. In the author’s interview with
KōnoinApril2015,herecalled that itwasaroundthis timethat themediabegantorealise thathewas
innocent and thatAumwasbehind theMatsumoto attack—but the factswerenot yet strongenough
towarrant public apologies (Kōno 2015). Another turning point came in late February, whenAum
members kidnapped Kariya Kiyoshi, a Tokyo-based public notary who had been in a dispute with
18 Yomiuri Shimbun (1994) BMatsumoto no ‘sarin jiken’ kara 2 kagetsu^, 22nd August, p.30.
19 Asahi Shimbun (1994) BSarin jiken no modokashisa^, 3rd December, p.4; Yomiuri Shimbun (1994)
BMatsumoto sarin jiken kara 3 kagetsu^, 27th September, p.13.
20 Asahi Shimbun (1994) BSarin jiken no modokashisa^, 3rd December, p.4; BNippon, tadaima gogo 3ji^ 30th
December, p.5; Yomiuri Shimbun (1994) BKyōsei no nakami ga towareta 94 sesou^, 29th December, p.3.
21 Yomiuri Shimbun (1994) B1i wa kirokuteki mōsho dokusha ga eranda 94 nen Nihon 10 dai nyūsu^, 25th
December, p.14.
22 Yomiuri Shimbun (1995) B95 dokusha ga erabu kokunai 10 dai nyūsu^, 24th December, p.14.
23 Yomiuri Shimbun (1995) BYamanashi no sanroku de sarin zanryūbutsu o kenshutsu^, 1st January, p.1.
24 Asahi Shimbun (1995) BTBS to Fusōsha o ‘Meiyo Kison’ to teiso^, 7th January, p.30; BOumu Shinrikyō ga
Asahi Shimbunsha nado o teiso ‘Shūkan Asahi de Meiyo Kison’^, 10th January, p.26; Yomiuri Shimbun (1995)
BOumu Shinrikyō ga Shinchōsha nado uttae^, 14th January, p.30.
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Aum over his sister’s membership. Kariya later died after being forcibly administered a powerful
barbiturate.AsKariyahadwarnedhis friends that ifanythinghappenedtohim,Aumwouldbelikely
responsible, his disappearance added to public calls for Aum to be investigated.25 As Asahara
discovered that a national police raid of Aum’s premises was imminent, Aum hastily concocted a
plan to attack the Tokyo subway to sabotage the police investigation.
At around 8 am on 20thMarch, fivemen each boarded a train on different lines carrying bags of
sarinsolutionwrappedinnewspaper,puncturingthemwithsharpenedumbrellasas theydisembarked
and fled.Thevaporised sarin gas quickly spread through the carriages, and at one station, passengers
kicked the bags onto the platform in a panic, exacerbating the situation. The attack killed a total of
thirteen and injured over 6000 commuters. Unlike Matsumoto, the political message of the Tokyo
attackwas obvious: the three subway lines the culprits targeted (Hibiya,Marunouchi, and Chiyoda)
all passed through the bureaucratic nerve centre of Kasumigaseki—an area which houses various
ministries, theTokyoDistrictCourt,HighCourt,andtheSupremeCourt—aswellaspast thebusiness
district ofŌtemachi and popular retail districts of Shinjuku andGinza.
Even as the nation struggled to make sense of the scale and intent of the attack, the media
immediately condemned the attack as Ban unforgivable challenge to society .^26 Even before the
media had identified the perpetrators, they adopted a framework of moral dualism, suggesting that
the attack was committed by a Bdark, twisted shadow lurking somewhere in this peaceful and
prosperous society .^27 Strongly hinting at Aum’s involvement, themedia suggested that Bmultiple
fanatics^were likely behind the attack.28 Even ifAumwas not explicitly named, journalists framed
articles on the attack alongside articles and timelinesdiscussingAum’s alleged involvement in sarin
manufacture.29 A sense of Beeriness^ (bukimi) permeated the national mood.30 Prime Minister
Murayama Tomiichi decried the attack as Bunforgivable^ and vowed to bring the perpetrators to
justice.31 BIt is no exaggeration to say that the subway sarin incident is horrific violence against all
humans–no, against all life^,wrote theweekly contemporary affairsmagazineSundayMainichi.32
In someways, theMatsumoto sarin attackwas catalytic to the instantaneous comprehension of the
Tokyo attack as a cultural trauma. As a recent example of a sarin attack, Matsumoto provided a
referencepoint for thepublic tovividlyrecall thehorrorsof thechemicalweapon: theBnightmare^of
Matsumoto had returned to haunt Japan once again.33 The police therefore categorised the Tokyo
attack as an Borganised indiscriminate terrorist incident^ straightaway.34 Put simply, the Tokyo
attack immediately became a cultural trauma (Ushiyama and Baert 2016).
Regrettably, subsequent social ramifications of theAumAffair in Japanese society are beyond the
scope of this article and are better discussed elsewhere (see, e.g., Baffelli and Reader 2012; Gardner
1999;Hardacre 2007;Kisala andMullins 2001; Pendleton 2009). In relation to theMatsumoto case,
25 Asahi Shimbun (1995) B‘Nanika attara keisatsu ni’ no memo^, 9th March, p.35; Yomiuri Shimbun (1995)
BShinagawa no kōdhō yakuba jimuchō rachi^, 4th March (Eve. Ed.), p.11.
26 Asahi Shimbun (1995) BDokugasu tero no sokoshirenu kyōfu (Shasetsu)^, 21st March, p.5.
27 Yomiuri Shimbun (1995) BYurushigatai chikatetsu sarin jiken^, 21st March, p.1.
28 Yomiuri Shimbun (1995) B(Shasetsu) Kyōshinteki na hankō o danjite yurusuna^, 21st March, p.3.
29 Yomiuri Shimbun (1995) BChikatetsu dokugasu taisakushitsu o setchi^, 20th March (Eve. Ed.), p.3.
30 Asahi Shimbun (1995) BTōkyō no chikatetsu sarin jiken^, 21 March, p.1; BOumu kyōdan no giwaku ni semare
(Shasetsu)^, 23rd March, p.5.
31 Asahi Shimbun (1995) BShūkan hōkoku^, 27th March, p.5; Yomiuri Shimbun (1995) BJūsōbi, bōdoku masuku
de totsunyū. ‘Oumu Shinrikyō’ sousaku 3.22 dokyumento^. 22nd March (Eve. Ed.), p.2.
32 Sunday Mainichi (1995) BSarin no senritsu: Gajōni fumikonda sōsa no kakushin^, 9th April, V74(19), p.20.
33 Asahi Shimbun (1995) BMe ga mienu, iki dekinu…Musabetsu no kyōfu mata^, 20th March (Eve. Ed.), p.15;
Yomiuri Shimbun (1995) BTonai Chikatetsu de hassei shita mōdoku gasu jiken^, 20th March (Eve. Ed.), p.1.
34 Yomiuri Shimbun (1995) BTonai Chikatetsu ni mōdoku gasu, sarin zanryūbutsu? Kenshutsu. Shibō 6, Fushō
900 nin^ 20th March (Eve. Ed.), p.1.
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the discovery of its true culprits was a mixed blessing for fact-finders. As the police raided Aum’s
premises two days after the attack (contrary to Asahara’s initial aims to divert attention from them),
investigators found massive quantities of sarin ingredients, confirming Aum’s culpability. As the
investigationprogressed, itbecameincreasinglyclear thatKōnohadbeenfalselyaccusedof theearlier
attack in Matsumoto. Alongside a torrent of media coverage on the Tokyo sarin attack, a flurry of
Bsincereapologies^ appeared innewspapers,magazines, andon television, apologising forgiving the
impression thatKōnowas the culprit. TheNaganoPrefectural Police also issuedapublic statement of
Bregret^ surrounding the investigation in June that year.35 As Aum’s senior disciples were arrested
fromApril onwards (culminating inAsahara’s arrest on 16thMay), they also admitted their involve-
ment in the Matsumoto attack; the culprits were rearrested in July, several weeks after the first
anniversary of the attack. At this point, the media could now confidently include Matsumoto as an
instancewithinthecultural traumaoftheAumAffair(BOumuJiken^).Inthisnew,rearticulatedtrauma
narrative, Matsumoto represented a key turning point as Aum’s first foray into terrorism. However,
because of the delayed articulationof traumanarratives, and themuchbigger scale of theTokyo sarin
attack,Matsumoto never became a cultural trauma independent of the greater subsuming label of the
AumAffair. Moreover, public institutions now faced an embarrassing and inconvenient question of
how to acknowledgeMatsumoto as a shameful case of false accusation.
Commemorating Matsumoto as a Difficult Past
The first anniversary of the Matsumoto attack coincided roughly with confessions by its true
perpetrators. In line with much of media coverage on the Aum Affair at the time, commemorative
reports urged that the entirety ofAum’s violencemust be uncovered andAumheld accountablewith
the full force of the law. Commemoration ofMatsumoto as an attack on innocent civilians, however,
hadtobejuxtaposedwiththemedia’srecognitionoftheirgraveerrorsthepreviousyear.Thisprompted
newspapers to repeatedly make apologies, and to run special reports examining their coverage of
Matsumoto the previous year.36 Newspapers expressed regret for relying on police information
excessivelywithout independentfact-checking,andfor ignoringexperts’suggestions thatKōnocould
not have made a potent nerve gas.37 Apologies were not restricted to print media: mainstream TV
35 Yomiuri Shimbun (1995) BMatsumoto sarin jiken Nagano Kenkei ga Kōno san taku otozure ‘ikan no i’^, 12th
June (Eve. Ed.) p.19.
36 Asahi Shimbun (1995) BMatsumoto sarin jiken kara 1 nen: izoku no omoi^, 25th June, p.33; Yomiuri Shimbun
(1995) BMatsumoto sarin 7 nin no giseisha^, 26th June, p.26.
37 Asahi Shimbun (1995) BKōno san ni owabi suru^, 14th June, p.5; BMatsumoto sarin jiken^, 8th July, p.37;
Yomiuri Shimbun (1995) BKenshō ‘Matsumoto sarin’ hōdō^, 7th July, p.19.
Table 1 BTop Ten News of 1994, as selected by readers^ (Yomiuri Shimbun, 25th December 1994; pg. 14)
1. Record heat wave leads to serious water shortages.
2. Astronaut Mukai Chiaki goes to space.
3. Ōe Kenzaburō wins the Nobel Prize for Literature.
4. Baseball team Yomiuri Giants win the championship.
5. Airbus airplane crash lands at Nagoya airport, killing 264.
6. Political instability after three successive Prime Ministers take office in one year.
7. Bullying in schools leads to a series of suicides.
8. Rice shortage results in price hikes.
9. Sumo wrestler Takanohana is promoted to the rank of Yokozuna (the highest title).
10. Seven die as a result of toxic gas Bsarin^ (Matsumoto).
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broadcasters also aired special segments examining how their news coverage had led to an uncritical
accusation of Kōno. Perhaps unsurprisingly, these expressions of apology and regret did not come
from sincerity alone. Earlier in the year, Kōno had sought help from the Japan Federation of Bar
Associations for violation of human rights and had initiated legal action against majormedia outlets.
During this process, he had agreed to drop the lawsuits if themedia outlets individually issued public
apologies (Kōno 2001: 214–227).
Commemorativemedia coverage ofMatsumoto reversedKōno’s image fromsuspect to victim-
hero. In the new retelling of the trauma drama, the media recast Kōno as a victim-hero protagonist
who persevered through formidable adversity. Hewas victimised three times over by the attack: he
was personally injured, hiswife fell into a coma fromwhich she never regained consciousness until
her passing in 2008, and his reputation was severely damaged by the allegations. Though Kōno
never spoke as an official representative for Matsumoto victims, his public interventions had now
gained moral authority beyond any other individual affected by the attack. Kōno decried the
investigative process and the police’s forceful attempts to extract a confession, as well as the
speculative and irresponsible media coverage.38
ThecommemorationofMatsumotohas stoodapart fromothercrimescommittedbyAum,as the
false accusation has been a recurring theme in remembering Matsumoto alongside condemning
Aum’sviolence.Thus,unlikethecommemorationof theTokyoattack,whichhasbeencharacterised
by unequivocalmoral condemnation ofAum as amind-controlling cult (Baffelli andReader 2012;
Ushiyama and Baert 2016), the symbolic opposition of Japan as good and Aum as evil has been
attenuated somewhat in public discussions of Matsumoto as the media have had to acknowledge
theirownmoral transgressions.Forexample, in1999,YomiuriShimbunandAsahiShimbunbothran
a series of reports marking five years since the Matsumoto attack. The reports featured interviews
with survivors still suffering from physical and psychological aftereffects of sarin poisoning39 and
storiesof loss fromvictims’ families,40butalso includedextendedinterviewswithKōnoinwhichhe
called for more financial support to sarin victims.41 Asahi Shimbun’s tenth anniversary commem-
orative coverage also focused on the failings ofmedia institutions, devoting considerably less space
to thecontextof theattackor experiencesof victimsbesidesKōnoandhis family.42Thecentralityof
Kōno as the protagonist of Matsumoto as a tragic drama was repeatedly emphasised as the
MatsumotoMayormadeannualvisits toKōno’sunconsciouswife inhospital.Newspapers reported
on the Matsumoto Mayor’s annual visitations to Kōno and his wife, even when other forms of
commemorative media coverage were absent.43
38 Asahi Shimbun (1995) BMatsumoto sarin jiken^, 8th July, p.37; BMatsumoto sarin jiken no daiichi tsūhōsha,
Kōno Yoshiyuki san no owaranu takakai^, 17th July, p.35; Yomiuri Shimbun (1995) BMatsumoto jiken de Oumu
no Asahara hikoku ra taiho^, 17th July, p.31.
39 Asahi Shimbun (1999) BSarin no kyōfu kiezu: Matsumoto sarin jiken, kyō de 5 nen^, 27th June, p.25; Yomiuri
Shimbun (1999) BKyōkō no ato: Matsumoto sarin jiken kara 5 nen (1)^, 22nd June, p.28.
40 Yomiuri Shimbun (1999) BKyōkō no ato: Matsumoto sarin jiken kara 5 nen (3)^, 24th June, p.34.
41 Asahi Shimbun (1999) B‘Higaisha shien no jūjitsu o’ Matsumoto sarin jiken 5 nen de sinpo^, 28th June
(Nagano Ed.), p.27; (2004) B‘Mimai uketekureta. Omoi’ Kōno san tsuma no nyūin saki ni Oumu^, 27th June
(Nagano Ed.), p.32; Yomiuri Shimbun (1999) BKyōkō no ato: Matsumoto sarin jiken kara 5 nen (2)^, 23rd June,
p.26.
42 Asahi Shimbun (2004) BDatsu ‘Hannin shi hōdō’ o mosaku^, 23rd June, p.37; BKōno Yoshiyuki san ga
furikaeru^, 24th June (Nagano Ed.), p.27; BMatsumoto Misuzugaokakō moto hōsō buin^, 26th June (Nagano
Ed.), p.27; (2005) BHassei 11 nen, kaifuku inoru Kōno san tsuma o shichō ga mimai^, 27th June (Nagano Ed.),
p.29.
43 Asahi Shimbun (2004) B‘Teisei wa sumiyaka ni’ Kōno Yoshiyuki san, shinpo de teigen^, 27th June (Nagano
Ed.), p.37; Yomiuri Shimbun (2000) BMatsumoto sarin jiken kara, maru 6 nen^, 28th June, p.32; (2002)
BMatsumoto sarin jiken no Kōno Sumiko san Ariga Shichō ga mimai^, 28th June (Nagano Ed.), p.32.
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Kōno has been the subject of commemoration in television and film as well. The 2000 feature
filmJapan’sBlackSummer:FalseAccusation (Nihonnokuroi natsu:Enzai) bydirectorKumaiKei
reconstructs the night of the Matsumoto attack and the subsequent police investigation (Kumai
2000). In thefilm,a teamofhigh-school reporters interviewsalocal televisionstationandacharacter
based on Kōno to retrace the circumstances of the attack, to discover why an innocent victim was
suspected as the perpetrator. The film was made with Kōno’s assistance, and some scenes were
filmed inside his home. Similarly, a 2009 TV documentary-drama by broadcaster Fuji Terebi
recreatedKōno and his family’s ordeal, featuring interviewswithKōno and his children.44 In these
symbolic representations, the primary narrative centred on Kōno’s personal biography, not on the
broader context of Aum’s crimes.
The focus on Kōno as a subject of commemorative media coverage arguably had other
implications, namely, the isolation of institutional failures to this one instance as an exceptional
Bone-off^ to the effect of neglecting discussions about other equally serious failures by the
media and the state in relation to the Aum Affair. Three examples deserve attention. The first is
the so-called TBS scandal. In 1989, the TV broadcaster TBS was visited by high-ranking Aum
disciples. TBS executives were pressured into secretly showing them unaired interview footage
with a lawyer named Sakamoto Tsutsumi, who represented parents of Aum believers opposed
to their children joining the movement. After the disciples relayed the interview contents (which
were highly critical of Aum) back to Asahara, Asahara ordered Sakamoto and his family to be
killed. When details of this meeting emerged over the course of investigation in 1995, TBS
instigated a cover-up until it was forced to admit in 1996 that the encounter took place, leading
to the CEO’s resignation (Hardacre 2007). Second, various media outlets had invited Asahara to
appear on TV debates and variety shows in the early 1990s, while downplaying controversies
Aum was already embroiled in, including the Bdisappearance^ of the Sakamoto family (a case
which remained unsolved until 1995).Media outlets therefore failed to exercise due diligence in
researching the controversial background of the movement in the early 1990s, while contrib-
uting to Aum’s PR strategy. Third, the intense national reaction against Aum following the
subway attack resulted in civil rights violations by state authorities against Aum believers,
including false arrests of Aum members, the rejection of resident records submitted by
believers, and barring children of Aum members (including Asahara’s children) from receiving
compulsory education. Unlike Matsumoto, these institutional failures are rarely discussed in
commemorative coverage of the Aum Affair. In this sense, self-critique by media and state
institutions regarding their handling of the Aum Affair has been selective and self-serving,
insofar as it has contained institutional failures to this one instance, and has circumvented
discussions about deeper, underlying problems within these institutions.
Furthermore, the predominant characterisation of Matsumoto as a case of false accusation
has meant that experiences of other victims and survivors have received less attention. Novelist
Murakami Haruki’s interviews with victims of the Tokyo subway attack, for instance, pose the
central question, Bwhat actually happened in the Tokyo subway the morning of 20 March,
1995?^ (Murakami 2003: 196, italics in original). Despite his attentiveness to the experiences
of Tokyo’s victims, the Matsumoto attack is a blindspot in his attempt to understand the Aum
Affair. Nevertheless, the intense focus on Kōno as the protagonist of this trauma drama has
meant that Kōno was able to establish a new career as a prolific public speaker and campaigner
for victims’ rights. Over the past two decades, he has spoken on topics ranging from his own
44 Asahi Shimbun (2009) BTsuma yo! Matsumoto sarin jiken: Hinichijō ga nichijō ni natta^, 22nd June 2009,
p.17.
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experiences as a suspect and the need for a public system to support crime victims to issues
relating to medical care for his wife (Kōno 2015). He has also taken on several public
positions, such as the Public Security Commissioner for the Nagano Prefectural Police, and
a consultant for a charity that supports traumatised victims of crime and natural disasters. Kōno
has also rebuked discriminatory practices employed by security authorities and members of the
public against Aum believers, many of whom decided to stay even after the arrests of the
leadership (Kōno 2008). Unlike many other victims who are vehemently opposed to Aum and
its successor groups, he has been on amicable terms with some of its members, going as far as
befriending a former believer who served a sentence for building the truck used in the
Matsumoto attack (Ibid.). As Kōno explained, he believes people should be judged by their
character, not external labels; as the former believer had already paid his dues by serving in
prison, Kōno bore no ill will against him (Kōno 2015).
Conclusions
This article has proposed the theoretical utility of a distinction between fact-finders and
narrators and has highlighted the crucial role fact-finders play in elucidating the facts of a
case in the construction of cultural trauma. Information such as casualty tolls, knowledge of
perpetrators’ identity,modus operandi, and motives all contribute towards the construction of a
coherent and persuasive trauma narrative, which narrators do not necessarily have the profes-
sional capability or authority to discover. Fact-finders may play a secondary role in directly
addressing the public regarding the moral significance of events but nonetheless provide the
essential empirical basis to trauma discourse. Of course, the extent of involvement by fact-
finders is contextual. For instance, in the case of terrorist attacks, their modus operandi—from
bombings and mass shootings to running over pedestrians—may mean that narrators are able
to perceive and condemn events as cultural traumas in a relatively straightforward manner.
Nevertheless, fact-finders such as the police still play a role in classifying and declaring events
as Bterrorist attacks^, not to mention going after suspects. As the Matsumoto example shows,
when fact-finders do not recognise the event as being a terrorist attack, even when there is a
massive number of casualties, the public recognition that the event has been Btraumatic^
remains underdeveloped.
Substantively, the Matsumoto investigation exposed fundamental weaknesses inherent within
Japanesepublic institutions.Thepolice’s relianceonextractingconfessions, sometimes throughharsh
interrogation,hasbeenassociatedwithexceptionallyhighconvictionratesamongdevelopedcountries
but has also resulted in a number of cases of miscarriages of justice when confessions were obtained
under duress. Institutional reform has been slow, with the compulsory video recording of police
interviewsbrought into lawin2016.TheMatsumotocase,aswellas thepolice investigationfollowing
theTokyo attack, also revealedmedia outlets’ inability or reluctance tohold state powers accountable.
During the intense media coverage of Aum Shinrikyō from 1995 onwards, fewmedia organisations
explicitly challenged illegal actions and civil rights violations by state authorities against Aum
members.ThoughMatsumotoprovidedanopportunityforthepresstoreconsideritscollusiverelations
with thestate, themedia largelycarriedonasbeforewithoutmajor institutional reform.Infact,political
constraints to the media have intensified since the mid-1990s following the rise of right-wing
movements, exemplified by revisionist calls for Bpatriotic^ history textbooks (Hashimoto 2015;
Seaton 2007). Such movements, combined with the second Abe government’s (2012–) harassment
and intimidation of media institutions over critical coverage of government policy and
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discussionsdeemedBunpatriotic^, havecontributed toadeteriorationofpress freedominrecentyears.
The2017PressFreedomIndexplacesJapanat72outof180;Japanhasconsistentlyrankedlowamong
developedcountries (ReporterswithoutBorders 2018).This arguably explainswhynewsmediahave
beenkeentosingleoutBperpetrators^ seentobelocatedoutsideoftheJapanesemoralcommunitysuch
asKōno andAum,while themedia’s pursuit of scandals related to the state or elites—the Fukushima
nuclear disaster chief among them—has been lacklustre.Consequently, the current discursive climate
seemstoprivilegeclaimstocollectivetraumaandvictimhood,whilestymieingsymbolicidentification
of the Japanese nation or state as perpetrators of cultural traumas inflicted domestically and
internationally.
LookingbeyondcontemporaryJapan, this articlehas suggested thatcultural traumatheoryand
collectivememory studiesmorebroadly couldbenefit fromagreater attentiveness to fact-finding
processes. For example, a potential avenue of enquiry may be to clarify the extent to which
emergency services and relief workers play a role in the initial assessment of the severity of
incidents. Similarly, scientific experts such as forensic scientists, meteorologists, and seismolo-
gistsmay play an important role in categorising and coding events as they locate the causes of the
phenomena, categorise their sizeandscale, andcompare themagainst similarhistorical examples:
who declares a phenomenon as a natural or manmade Bdisaster^? How does a weather phenom-
enonget categorised,andgivenan identity throughnaming, as it evolves fromaBweather system^
to aBtropical storm^, and finallyaBhurricane^?Whatwas theearthquake’smagnitude, andwhere
was its epicentre?Howdoes a natural disaster or crimecompare to previous instances?While still
retaining the core insight of cultural sociology, namely its sensitivity to symbolic aspects of social
life, such an approach would extend the scope of collective memory research to occupational
cultures and practices of expert professions.
It is also possible to explore how technological developments change the ways trauma
narratives are told. New technologies enable narrators to present and disseminate visual
representations of horrific events more quickly and farther than ever before. Video footage
of violence, captured through mobile phones, CCTV cameras, and police dash-cams and body-
cams, can be uploaded to social media and news websites within hours, if not minutes, after an
incident takes place. These videos are then sorted through algorithms, tagged with hashtags,
and shared among global audiences. These videos may require expert and independent
verification (for example, that the footage is actually from the event it purports to describe,
or that it has not been edited to give a misleading impression), and thus assures the role of fact-
finders to an extent. However, it seems undeniable that many ordinary individuals without
expert knowledge or socio-cultural prestige can now enter public discourse to voice their
experiences and opinions more easily through the use of social media. An STS-informed
approach may help to clarify how technology changes the ways in which trauma narratives
take shape through social media and beyond.
Finally, there remains a question of whether cultural traumas can be wholly imagined or
fictitious, in the absence of credible facts. This paper has suggested that although there may be
exceptional instancesof imagined trauma,claims tocultural traumaare likely tobechallengedand
discredited without a modicum of reliable evidence. Hence, when President Donald Trump’s
Counsellor Kellyanne Conway alluded to the non-existent BBowling Green Massacre^ as a
justification for the travel ban fromMuslim-majority countries in January 2017, her comments
received universal ridicule and condemnation (Smith 2017). Fictitious Balternative facts^ do not
lend themselves easily to traumanarration.Unfortunately, fictitious traumasdoseemtopropagate
at times when fact-finders fail to function and thrive in cultures in which fear of the cultural
BOther^ trumps thedemandforaccuracy,as themassacreofethnicKoreans in Japanfollowingthe
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1923 Great Kanto Earthquake demonstrates. Following a magnitude 7.9 earthquake which
flattened much of Tokyo and its surrounding areas, there were widespread false rumours that
ethnic Koreans had been seen carrying bombs and had poisoned the well water. This imagined
trauma of Koreans attacking the Japanese, arguably magnified by Japanese public anxieties of
Koreanuprisingandretribution inthecontextof thecolonizationoftheKoreanPeninsula, resulted
in the massacre of more than 6000Koreans at the hands of vigilante mobs and public authorities
(Ryang 2003). In this case, the real devastation of the earthquake led to an entirely fabricated
cultural trauma of Koreans attacking Japan, ending in a bloodbath and further victimisation of a
subjugatedminority population. There aremany differences between the false rumours in Tokyo
and Conway’s remarks, but a stark point of contrast lies in the response of the fact-finders.
Whereasexpertsunanimously refutedConway’s remarksaserroneous, theaftermathof theKanto
Earthquake saw the police actively encourage violence against Koreans on the basis of mere
rumour amidst the total breakdown of social order (Ibid.). In this sense, the role of fact-finders
becomes evermore important in the caseof fabricated traumas, as theyhave theauthority tocredit
trauma narratives as real or discredit them as Bfake news^; as such, they possess the capacity to
steer the direction of emerging fictitious trauma narratives and their consequences.
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